You are well aware how much attention has been given in the last few years to Colonial Military expenditure. First, there sat in 1860 a Government Committee composed of a permanent member of the Treasury, the War Department, and the Colonial Office. In 1861 the subject was reported on by a Committee of the House of Commons. In 1862 the Defence Committee attended by a Representative of the War Office and of this Office reviewed the whole subject of Colonial Fortifications. [Marginal note: Their report was made in Jany 1863, but has not been published.]

The conclusions, as might be expected on so wide and various a field, were not very precise, but their tendency was sufficiently plain. The small Committee of Government Officials, the subsequentCommittee Committee of the House of Commons and the Defence Committee all evidently agreed in thinking that too much in the way of military aid had been done for the Colonies previously, and that less ought to be done in future.

The two things to be considered in respect of defence are Troops and Works. No Troops have ever been sent to Vancouver. On the formation of British Columbia, Sir E. Lytton sent to it a Company of Royal Engineers, in order that they might answer the twofold object of making roads and doing other useful works, and at the same time filling the part of Troops. They never did act as Soldiers, and there is reason to believe that their work was very costly; and they have been recalled with the unanimous consent of all parties.

On the occurrence of the difficulty at San Juan, the required English detachment wasfurnished furnished by a party of 100 Royal Marines. When Lord Russell was told that these men had been detained so long that their relief was called for in the ordinary course of service, His Lordship at once said that as the War in China was over, a Regiment of the Line ought to be brought from thence to Vancouver. The Military Authorities did not actually resist but they strongly protested against sending a single Regiment so far from all support; and as the Army was kept longer than expected in China, the subject was tacitly allowed to drop.

I have recapitulated these facts, because on the subject's first coming before Mr Cardwell, he may wish to know it in all it's bearings. But the present application is limited to the object of getting one or more Forts or Batteries. The Commons' Committee, in Par. 18 of their Report, give a decided opinion against multiplying Fortifications. The Defence Committee made adistinction distinction between places in which Forts are wanted for some general object of National policy and those where they are wanted, if at all, for local defence. They confined their suggestions to Stations of the former kind; and only recommended the maintenance of works at Imperial cost in positions where they involve an Imperial interest.

The following are examples of such places:

Commanding positions on the Globe, such as Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda and Halifax.

Places important to Maritime traffic and for Eastern Trade and Eastern Empire, such as the Cape, Mauritius and Hong Kong.

Points of Rendezvous for any National Force employed in time of war in the protection of large tracts of British dominions, such as Jamaica in the West Indies.

Do the twin Colonies of Vancouver Id and British Columbia come under any of these descriptons? It seems to me very doubtful.They They may indeed give a great command over the North Pacific, but we have no English Trade and interests in that Ocean such as those of India, China and Australia. What we do in these two Colonies therefore must be, it may be argued, for their own sake and not for that of anything lying beyond them. If British Columbia turns out a grand gold producing Colony such as those in Australia, it ought to be able to pay for it's own Forts as they do, and so ought Vancouver as sharing it's prosperity. If British Columbia does not so turn out, it cannot yield so large a commerce as would give a reason for defending it with Imperial money for the sake of an Imperial interest.

On the other hand Vancouver seems to afford the best Harbor open to the British Navy on the Pacific shore of either North or South America; and it may possibly be worth while, on purely Naval grounds, to protect thatHarbor Harbor by Works on shore. But this would be a ground lying beyond our province.

If therefore I were desired to suggest a course, it would be as follows: I should forward a copy of this despatch to the Admiralty and to the War Office. I should say that Mr Cardwell does not find sufficient reason to recommend the construction of Fortifications at Vancouver Island on Colonial grounds or for mere purposes of local defence. But the further question whether some Fortifications at the two chief Harbors of Vancouver are required for the convenience and safety of Her Majesty's Navy, and are so desirable that they ought to be provided for on Army or Navy Estimates as general objects of national policy, is a matter of which the judgment belongs more immediately to the Secretary of State for War and the Lords Com[missione]rs of the Admiralty,and and which therefore Mr Cardwell can only forward for their consideration.