This subject is new to me, as I was absent on leave when the suggestion arrived. And the original Papers being mislaid, and only copies obtainable, I have not the advantage of seeing any Minute which Lord Carnarvon may have made. It is therefore with diffidence that, on a subject involving large questions of nationalpolicy policy, I will note what occurs to me.

Admiral Denman seems to me to have no more than done his duty in pointing out that unless Vancouver can be well defended, the Naval Depôt there should not be increased beyond the ordinary wants of a time of peace. Of course Stores should not be accumulated where they are likely to fall into the hands of an enemy. He also justly observes that if the permanent retention of the Country is doubtful, our interests there shouldnot not be needlessly extended, nor any special encouragement held out to Emigrants (which in fact is not done). These remarks are correct; but they point, it will be observed, not to a single conclusion, but to a choice between two alternatives.

Vancouver is for practical purposes probably the most inaccessible to Great Britain of any settled part of the Globe. At the time of the Trent crisis, we were at our wits ends to get a Despatch safely conveyed across the Isthmus of Panama. Troops and Storesmust must go round Cape Horn by a voyage of, I should conjecture, about four months. The place is about twice as far in time as the Antipodes. If we were to fortify Vancouver there would be:

1st The cost of the Batteries and of their Armament (no mean Item in modern days).

2nd The expense of a Garrison, for we could not plant Works and Guns without a defensive force; and the inhabitants are too few, too busy, and of too lukewarm an attachment to us, to be employedfor for the purpose.

3rdly When all is done, we should in the immediate neighbourhood of the overwhelming population of California, be attempting with a scanty, mixed, and not universally well-affected population, at a distance of three or four months from England, what is considered difficult in Canada with a population of Millions, thoroughly well-disposed to the connexion, and within some ten or twelve days steaming of our shores.

Whilst agreeing therefore in the dilemma put by AdmiralDenman Denman, there seems to be much to be said for letting things alone, and awaiting the course of events. The War Office it will be seen, are not disposed to undertake a Defensive Work. For my part I would shrink from no expenditure of lives or Treasure on any object dear to England; but I cannot help doubting whether it would be worth while to do so in order to provide a Government for the Americans who, I suspect, must in the long run form the majority of the inhabitants of Vancouver and British Columbia.

The only question is whether it may not be desirable with a view to many contingencies whwhich are quite possible if not probable in the U.S. to remove the feeling of discontent, whwhich from many quarters we are told exists in V.C.I., by some local changes & commissions provided that they do not involve a large or permanent expenditure on this country.

As regards the dock the expense wdwould probably be considerable & the value—except commercially, in whwhich case it ought to be constructed as a private undertaking—slight. But I sd wish to have some information as to the cost of making Esquimalt a packet station. Admiral Denman speaks of it as trifling. We know from other sources that it wdwould be viewed as a great boon by the Colony. A Private communication to the Treasury or Post Office wdwould be the best means of ascertaining this.

Something may perhaps be done on the spot by preserving to Victoria some of the advantages of a capital. But GovrGovernor Seymour will be best able to speak on this point.

I shall be glad to be informed on the point I have noted above.

Admiral Denman suggests two measures the creation of a Dock at Esquimalt and the establishment of a Packet Station there, which he says might be effected at a very small expense on the present contracts.

I have placed myself in communication with the late Governor of Vancouver Island, Captain Kennedy, with Captain Richards, R.N. the Hydrographer of the Admiralty, who was on the North Pacific Station for 7 years, and with Mr W.J. Page, one of the Chief Clerks at the General Post Office whose business is to superintend Colonial Post Office questions. Adding my own informationto to theirs on these subjects the result is as follows: On the whole of the N. American side of the N. Pacific there is not a single Dock belonging to Great Britain where Vessels of War or Merchantmen can repair their disasters. They are obliged to go to San Francisco for that purpose, and are consequently entirely dependent on the courtesy of the Americans to enable them to refit. Captain Richards' ship, during the critical time of the "Trent" difficulty, was actually in dock at San Francisco and might have been impounded if war had occurred. The want of a dock has been felt tobe be a most serious evil—but the Admiralty have not thought proper to remedy it. An attempt was made by a commercial company to make a dock but it fell through, and at the present time there is little probability of any renewal of it from that source: But are there not grounds for the work being undertaken by the British Government? Vancouver Island and B. Columbia cannot be defended by Forts and Garrisons. Their only protection is by the means of a naval force. We have on the Station now 13 Vessels of war of differentsizes sizes, numbering 191 guns. These ships must occasionally require repairs. It would be worth while to know what these repairs annually cost the Admiralty in a foreign port. If we must have a squadron on the station we surely ought to possess in a British port facilities for repairing them, and not be beholden to any foreign country for such convenience which may be withheld at pleasure. Captain Richards, on a rough estimate, thinks £80,000 would probably suffice for the work. But I fear this sum would not be enough; for the land about Esquimaltis is in the hands of private parties, and would have to be purchased. The Admiralty have a very small bit of ground there. The harbor of Esquimalt is one of the finest in the world. The objection may be raised that if the Imperial GovtGovernment makes this dock we might only be making if for the Americans. But ought this objection to prevail? We have these Colonies, and are bound to protect them as long as we can. And can we do so, in time of war, without a dock of our own?

If Lord Carnarvon should at all agree in the view I have faintly sketched a lettermight might be written to the Admiralty referring to Admiral Denman's suggestion as to the dock, desiring to know whether, in consideration of the duty imposed on this country of affording protection to these Colonies by the means of a Naval Squadron, their Lordship's consider that a dock can any longer be dispensed with. That representations have, it is understood, been addressed at different times [to] H.M. GovtGovernment on this subject, and that Lord Carnarvon is of opinion that the suggestion made by Admiral Denman deserves the early and serious attention of the Admiralty. 2. Packet Station

When the Colony of British Columbia was established Lord Lytton pressed very strongly for a postal subsidy. But it could not be granted. In 1863 Mr Childers revived the subject with no better success. * The two Colonies were therefore compelled to get their correspondence conveyed in the best way they could, which has been by the means of the American Steamers.