Despatch to London.
Minutes (3), Other documents (1).
Confidential
15 January 1863
My Lord Duke,
Rumours having, for some time past, been in Circulation that the
United States Government were about to send out Iron Clad Ships to
their possessions on this Coast, and these reports having assumed a
more authentic shape, I consider it a matter of duty to bring the
subject under the notice of Her Majesty's Government in order that
something may be done for our protection.
2. It is stated on good authority that four iron clad ships are to
be sent out to this coast—one for San Francisco—one for the
Columbia river, and one for Puget Sound—of the same class as the
Monitor, intended for harbour defences, and one sea-going iron clad
Steamer—for the Service of the American possessions generally.
3. One of the Monitors will be finished this month and isto to come
out from New York, immediately, in Sections, and to be put together
at San Francisco.
4. I may here remark that Captain Richards of H.M.S. "Hecate" is of
opinion that if the iron were sent out from England, vessels of the
suitable Character for Coast defence could be built at Victoria of
Douglas Pine.
5. I am convinced that there is a necessity for preparation on our
part; as to be prepared is just what will save a war.
A cause of quarrel, it is hardly necessary to observe, may arise any
day, unexpectedly; and, if a cause occur, the folly of a war will not
prevent it on the part of our fiery neighbours, if they find us
unprepared.
I have been assured that in the "Trent" affair Secretary Seward did
not intend to give up Slidell and Mason until he saw the preparations
of England for War, and, even then, it was the inefficient state of
the American Navy that forced him to forego his warlike intention.
6. Another contingency which renders it necessary for us to look
carefully to the future is this, that a large party in the North
embracing nearly all the territorial and commercial wealth of the
Country, and likely to gain the suffrages, in good time, of all
parties, except the extreme abolitionists, intend so soon as the
Northern Army gains enough of success by sea or land to redeem its
character to propose to the South to
re-unite under Southern principles with a Southern ascendancy,
and in short, to let the South have it all its own way, on the simple
condition of restoring the Union.
7. The reason given for their course of action is that all
respectable Americans wish to make all their institutions more
conservative than they have hitherto been, so that property will be
duly represented and protected; but to effect any change of this
nature will require the abolition of universal suffrage, to take
political power out of the hands of the Mob. This cannot be done
except by a Military despotism or by the aid of the South or rather
by both combined for a reason.
8. The adoption of the southern Constitution would effect nearly
all the desired objects, and it is remarkable how many Northern
Americans although Unionists, and for the War, prefer this new
Constitution of the Southern States to their own—and for the simple
reason that it is conservative. A modified and reformed Tariff to
favour the South is part of the Programme.
9. The moral which I draw from these views is that the very day
these people unite again as a nation they will unite in a war with
England. Their abuse of each other and its development in the war is
no unsurmountable impediment to a reconciliation. We are hated with
about equal intensity by Americans of both sections, and if united
they could give us a great deal of trouble.
10. I am told by the Naval Officers here, and I quote their opinion
as of more value on that subject than my own, that any sort of iron
or iron clad vessel slipping from the opposite shores across the
straits could without fail destroy a whole Squadron of our wooden
ships without receiving any injury herself, as all these Monitors are
invulnerable to the shot of the older vessels, while they can pierce
them with every shot.
11. I trust Your Grace will excuse me for calling your attention so
earnestly to this matter which I deem of great importance.
12. I will further observe that whatever measure Your Grace may deem
it necessary to adopt—whether to send out iron plates and have
vessels built here, or to build the vessels in England and send them
out in sections to be put up here, which would probably be the better
plan—I deem it a matter of common prudence to guard against the
dangers I have pointed out, in order to avert disgrace and the
disaster of defeat.
I have the honor to be,
My Lord Duke,
Your Grace's,
Obedient humble Servant James Douglas
There seems to me very much of a busybody character in this despatch.
Officers at remote stations are apt sometimes to become over-excited
in fancying that they are scanning international relations and
prospects.
The alarm lest a fleet of Ships like the "Monitor" should invade the
waters of Columbia round Cape Horn,* reads oddly enough when we know
that the luckless "Monitor" herself perished in the much humbler
enterprize of trying to round Cape Hatteras.
For my part I should have thought nothing less probable than that
the North whilst engaged in an internecine struggle on its own shores
with the Southern States, would be so ill advised as to despatch a
fleet of iron clad ships to places at a distance of 3 or 4 months
voyage.
It may possibly be thought right to send a copy of the letter to the
Admiralty for their information, but I should doubt whether we ought
not to add that we do it without undertaking to support the views
expressed by the Governor.
The Govr might as well have spared his political speculations for
which he has no special aptitude when writing from Vancouvers Island
[remainder cut off microfilm].