M Cardwell
The
Duke of Newcastle was extremely anxious to establish
representative institutions in
British Columbia, but it was
impossible to do so formally, because we did not know enough
of the Colony to define a Constituency, and because its
circumstances were so shifting, and population so anomalous
that it was impossible to say what was good now would be
good three years
hence hence.
The result was the establishment (as a temporary step
in the desired direction) of a Legislature which was in
form a Crown Council, but (reversing the Augustan policy)
was by manipulation to be made representative. The anomaly of
B.C.
is that the Leg is a Crown Council but that the Crown does not
retain the power of Legislation by Order in Council.
It is the universal rule that the Members of such a Crown
Council hold Office till the Crown dismisses them in the
manner prescribed by usage or by the instrument under which they
hold their Offices.
A Representative Legislative body on the contrary
is is
by the Governor's Commission or other adequate authority
usually made subject to dissolution. Usually because some
Legislative Councills [sic] which coexist with an Assembly are not so.
The Columbian Council being virtually (though not
technically) in part representative
M Seymour without any
express authority in his Commission or otherwise took on
himself to apply to it the process of dissolution. This
may not have been very unnatural in a Governor who viewed
things politically & had never governed a Crown Colony.
His error and its possible consequences in invalidating
the nomination and proceedings of his Legislature were
pointed out to him. But he and his Attorney General will
not
own own themselves wrong, and go on arguing the case,
confusing as I should say, arguments of expediency with
arguments of law, and the practical effect of the
Duke
of Newcastle's measures, with the legal effect of the Order
in Council—which are
ex hypothesi extremely different.
It appears to me that when the error was discovered
the proper course was to let things go on for a time as if
the blot had not been hit; But at some convenient opportunity
after
the the
31 of December 1864, when the old Council
unquestionably expired from efflux of time, to reappoint the new Council
and then to get them to pass a Law removing doubts respecting
the validity of all that they had previously done. This I
think should be done still.
But
M Crease seems to me (whether I am in all respects
right or not) so much abroad in his notions of a Governor's
power that I should think it wise to give him a little treatise, and
with this object would write something
to to the following effect.
State that
M Cardwell is by no means desirous of forcing
upon the Government of
British Columbia any step which in
their opinion is likely to produce confusion. At the same
time that he fears that they may involve themselves in great
difficulties hereafter if they base their legal proceedings
on the views now put forward by the Attorney General.
If the question arises before a Court of Justice whether
a particular Governor
has has the power of pardoning a Criminal,
of suspending a delinquent Officer, of proroguing or
dissolving or convening a representative Assembly, of
assenting to a Law or of performing any other act which is
intended to have a legal effect, that question is generally
examined not on any abstract principles of expediency or
analogy but by enquiring what powers have in fact been
conferred upon him by written law such as an Act of Parliament
or a Local Law (or in some cases by an Order in Council)
or
or have been delegated to him by Her Majesty through some
appropriate and sufficient instrument.
Examining in this way the powers of the Governor of
British Columbia we find that an Act of Parliament 21 and
22 Vict: Cap 99 enabled Her Majesty to constitute a Legislature
for
British Columbia and that by an Order in Council dated
11 June 1863 Her Majesty did constitute such a Legislature.
The Order in Council does not provide that this Legislature
should be in any degree representative—but on the contrary
establishes
establishes a Council composed of persons nominated by the
Governor and holding their Offices during the pleasure of
the Queen. Councils of this kind exist in numerous other
Colonies—in fact in almost all Crown Colonies. In no
instance has the power of dissolving them been given to the
Governor and in no instance has it ever been required. If
it is necessary to withdraw the powers of such a Council
the Crown can always do so by cancelling their appointments.
The
British Columbian Order in Council
is is no exception to
the general rule. It certainly contains no express power
of dissolution, and its structure it corresponds
with that of other instruments which have never been intended or
supposed to imply any such power.
That the Order in Council was thus understood by the
Duke of Newcastle is clearly shown by the passage which is
quoted by
M Crease, in proof of the contrary supposition.
Circumstances
had had compelled His Grace to have recourse to
the expedient of constituting a partially representative
body under the form of a nominee Council. He had instructed
the Governor that what was legally speaking a Crown Council
was to be made practically representative, by placing in it
persons informally nominated by the inhab of the Colony,
and he wished to indicate that this body which was legally not
liable to dissolution, could yet be practically dissolved in
case of necessity by the cancellation of the Councillors'
appointments
appointments—this he indicated by the words, "subject to
Her Majesty's pleasure which involves a practical power
of dissolution." The words "practical power" implicitly
negative the idea of a legal power. It need hardly be
observed however that whatever m be the meaning of the
D of N's words they could not alter the effect of the Order
in Council. The phrase "unless previously determined" used
in
Sir J Douglas' proclamation of
28 Dec 1863,
w I
sh imagine he considered by a Court of Law to refer to the mode of
determination provided by Law—viz determination by the
expression of HM's pleasure, and not to create an
anomolous power of disposition not so provided.
But
M Crease appears to suppose that when an Officer
holds his appointment during the pleasure of the Crown that
pleasure is to be "expressed in the usual way by the
Representative of the Crown." He seems to consider that
functionaries holding during pleasure may be usually
dismissed
dismissed by the Governor.
The contrary however is the case. In Colonies possessing
Responsible Governments the Governor is by his Commission
authorized not only to suspend but to dismiss; but in all
other classes of Colonies the power of the Governor over
Officers holding under any Warrant or Commission is carefully
limited to suspension, the dismissal being effected by
confirmation of that suspension thro' the Secretary of State.
It would seem therefore at least very unsafe
to to rely
on
M Seymour's proceeding as either a valid dissolution
or a valid expression of Her Majesty's pleasure—and although
it may be improbable that the point should ever be raised,
it would seem safest, to reappoint the existing Councillors
which certainly can be done under the existing law and pass
a validating Act.
At the same time this ought to be done on some
occasion when there was no fear of the Council's refusing
to proceed to the requisite legislation.