Colonial Despatches
The colonial despatches of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871
Despatch to London
Douglas, James to Lytton, Edward George Earle Bulwer 17 January 1859, CO 305:10, no. 2729, 2.
Abstract
Despatch to London.
Minutes (4), Marginalia (1).
Douglas offers his observations on the water boundary dispute between Great Britain and the
United States. He advocates for the retention of the San Juan Islands and asserts that the most logical boundary runs down the Rosario Strait.
The minutes agree that San Juan Island is
indispensable to the safety of B. Columbiabut the CO does not understand Douglas’s resistance to the
middle channelcompromise suggested by the Admiralty.
No. 2
17 January 1859
I had the honor on the 12th of November last, in my despatch
No 47 of acknowledging the receipt of your Confidential
Despatch of the 21st of August, requesting me to furnish a
report as early as practicable on the subject of the disputed
line of Water Boundary between Vancouver's
Vancouver's Island and the
American Territory on the main land, and I now beg to submit the
few fresh ideas that have since occurred to me on a question
which has before been so closely investigated.
Vancouver's Island and the
American Territory on the main land, and I now beg to submit the
few fresh ideas that have since occurred to me on a question
which has before been so closely investigated.
2. I had the honor of addressing His Grace the Duke of
Newcastle, and of submitting the opinion which I entertained on
that subject in the several Despatches of the numbers and dates
noted in the margin.
No 10 24th Novr 1853
No 5 27th Feb 1854
No 5 27th Feb 1854
3. In those Despatches I stated the reasons
reasons which induced me to
assume that the Islands of San Juan, Lopez and Orcas, to which
the United States have set up a claim did of right belong to Her
Majesty the Queen, and come within the jurisdiction of the
Government of Vancouver's Island, or in other words that
"Vancouver's Strait" now more generally known as "Rosario
Strait" is the true channel through which the line of Water
Boundary was intended to be carried.
reasons which induced me to
assume that the Islands of San Juan, Lopez and Orcas, to which
the United States have set up a claim did of right belong to Her
Majesty the Queen, and come within the jurisdiction of the
Government of Vancouver's Island, or in other words that
"Vancouver's Strait" now more generally known as "Rosario
Strait" is the true channel through which the line of Water
Boundary was intended to be carried.
4. That conclusion was
was founded in the first place on a fair
construction of the language of the 1st Article of the Treaty
of the 15th June 1846. Secondly—on the common opinion of the
day. Thirdly—On the Maps published in both countries carrying
the line of Boundary through the middle of Vancouver's Straits.
was founded in the first place on a fair
construction of the language of the 1st Article of the Treaty
of the 15th June 1846. Secondly—on the common opinion of the
day. Thirdly—On the Maps published in both countries carrying
the line of Boundary through the middle of Vancouver's Straits.
5. My opinion in reference to the true line of Water Boundary
remains unaltered, or is rather confirmed by a circumstace
circumstance not
alluded to in my former reports on the subject. I mean the
intention of the negociators of the Treaty, as may be inferred
from the manner in which the Coasts of Vancouver's Island, and
the Continent on the 49th Parallel of Latitude were represented
in the best published Charts of the period when the Treaty was
concluded.
circumstance not
alluded to in my former reports on the subject. I mean the
intention of the negociators of the Treaty, as may be inferred
from the manner in which the Coasts of Vancouver's Island, and
the Continent on the 49th Parallel of Latitude were represented
in the best published Charts of the period when the Treaty was
concluded.
6. I transmit herewith a section taken from Vancouver's Chart,
showing
showing the Coast Lines in the Gulf of Georgia on the 49th
Parallel and embracing all the information on the subject
which Mr Buchanan and Mr Pakenham could possibly have had
access to, in fixing and describing the line of Water Boundary.
showing the Coast Lines in the Gulf of Georgia on the 49th
Parallel and embracing all the information on the subject
which Mr Buchanan and Mr Pakenham could possibly have had
access to, in fixing and describing the line of Water Boundary.
7. It will thereby be observed that the line of Coast on the
west side of the Gulf of Georgia, directly opposite Point Roberts, and where the Point is intersected by the 49th
49th
Parallel of North Latitude—now known to be a group of
Islands—was then supposed to be and represented in the Charts
of the day, as the East Coast of Vancouver's Island.
49th
Parallel of North Latitude—now known to be a group of
Islands—was then supposed to be and represented in the Charts
of the day, as the East Coast of Vancouver's Island.
8. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the intention of
the negociators must have been to carry on the line of Boundary
along the 49th Parallel to the middle of the channel which
separates the land of Point Roberts from the land
land shewn in the
charts of that day as the East Coast of Vancouver's Island.
land shewn in the
charts of that day as the East Coast of Vancouver's Island.
9. That point of the Boundary line being fixed as so described,
in the middle of that channel the Treaty goes on to say that it
is to be carried thence southerly through the middle of the said
channel and of Fuca Straits to the Pacific Ocean.
10. The only channel to which that description
description can really apply
is the channel followed by "Vancouver," with his two ships, by
Strawberry Bay, as traced upon the accompanying section of his
chart, before referred to.
description can really apply
is the channel followed by "Vancouver," with his two ships, by
Strawberry Bay, as traced upon the accompanying section of his
chart, before referred to.
11. That it was the intention of the negociators to carry the
Boundary through that channel, is thus I think distinctly shewn,
and I have heard no cause assigned on the part of the United
States Boundary Commissioners why that
that simple and obvious
rendering of the Treaty should not be adopted as its true sense
and meaning.
that simple and obvious
rendering of the Treaty should not be adopted as its true sense
and meaning.
12. It would certainly not be advisable for Her Majesty's
Government to adopt any other, than the above rendering of the
Treaty, without very careful consideration of the effect of any
new arrangement; lest we be thereby debarred from the use of a
safe and accessible Ship channel to the British Possessions in
the Gulf of Georgia.
The
13. The American Coasts on the Gulf of Georgia, being
accessible by a good Ship channel, even though the Islands of San Juan, Lopez and Orcas are confirmed to Great Britain; the
acquisition of those Islands may be considered as a question of
secondary importance to the United States; while to us their
acquisition is of vital consequence, for securing a Ship
communication with the most valuable and extensive portion of
British Columbia.
13. The American Coasts on the Gulf of Georgia, being
accessible by a good Ship channel, even though the Islands of San Juan, Lopez and Orcas are confirmed to Great Britain; the
acquisition of those Islands may be considered as a question of
secondary importance to the United States; while to us their
acquisition is of vital consequence, for securing a Ship
communication with the most valuable and extensive portion of
British Columbia.
That
14. That remark is especially meant to apply to a proposal
which is said to have been made here, of treating the whole
space between the continent and Vancouver's Island as one channel
and running the Boundary line through the middle of that space
without reference to any navigable channel, an arrangement which
unless the position of the Islands be greatly misunderstood,
would it appears to me, leave
leave on the British side of the line,
no navigable communication with the Gulf of Georgia.
14. That remark is especially meant to apply to a proposal
which is said to have been made here, of treating the whole
space between the continent and Vancouver's Island as one channel
and running the Boundary line through the middle of that space
without reference to any navigable channel, an arrangement which
unless the position of the Islands be greatly misunderstood,
would it appears to me, leave
leave on the British side of the line,
no navigable communication with the Gulf of Georgia.
I have etc.
Minutes by CO staff
Mr Merivale
This is the expected report. If I understand the Governor's meaning he objects to the middle line proposed by the Admiralty as the solution of the dispute.
This is the expected report. If I understand the Governor's meaning he objects to the middle line proposed by the Admiralty as the solution of the dispute.
ABd
15/3
Not exactly to the line proposed by the Admy but to a
theoretical middle line running through land & sea 
alike. The
arguments however would apply equally to the Admiralty line.
alike. The
arguments however would apply equally to the Admiralty line.
HM
Mh 16
Sir Edward Lytton
We have now before us Govr Douglas['s] report & Captn Richard's views upon the Water boundary and I doubt whether we shall obtain any further material for coming to a decision. The F.O. ask for your opinion, but all things considered I do not see how that opinion can be more than a general one. I do not quite understand Govr Douglas' objection to a theoretical line drawn midway between Vancouver's I. and the Continent on the ground that this wd leave us no navigable channel. On the contrary failing to secure the Rosario as the mid-channel I doubt whether this wd not be the best to adopt as most defensible in arguments and as securing substantially for us what we may reasonably think ourselves Entitled to. But we might as a
Modification of this principle of partition propose
that whilst we retain exclusive possession of the Haro, and
whilst we leave exclusive possession to the U.S. of the Rosario,
the middle channel wh Capt. Richards admits to be as navigable
as the two former, except that it is narrower, should be common
to both parties & form the line of demarcation between the
respective territories of the two nations. This it appears to
me wd not be an arrangement which wd be inexpedient for
British interests provided that we cannot obtain more.
We have now before us Govr Douglas['s] report & Captn Richard's views upon the Water boundary and I doubt whether we shall obtain any further material for coming to a decision. The F.O. ask for your opinion, but all things considered I do not see how that opinion can be more than a general one. I do not quite understand Govr Douglas' objection to a theoretical line drawn midway between Vancouver's I. and the Continent on the ground that this wd leave us no navigable channel. On the contrary failing to secure the Rosario as the mid-channel I doubt whether this wd not be the best to adopt as most defensible in arguments and as securing substantially for us what we may reasonably think ourselves Entitled to. But we might as a
Modification of this principle of partition propose
that whilst we retain exclusive possession of the Haro, and
whilst we leave exclusive possession to the U.S. of the Rosario,
the middle channel wh Capt. Richards admits to be as navigable
as the two former, except that it is narrower, should be common
to both parties & form the line of demarcation between the
respective territories of the two nations. This it appears to
me wd not be an arrangement which wd be inexpedient for
British interests provided that we cannot obtain more.
At the same time it wd be desirable to say in answer to Lord
Malmesbury that whilst it would be most advantageous to secure
the adoption of the Rosario as the water boundary you wd be
prepared to accept this principle of division (the Middle
Channel) 
& that if the arrangement cd be concluded
satisfactorily on that basis you wd not stand out for further
concessions & incur by delay the risk of negotiating hereafter
at a less favourable opportunity. If therefore in his opinion,
and from a closer knowledge of our relations with the U.S. than
is possible for us to have, he thinks that there is a reasonable
prospect of defining the middle channel as the Rosario, you feel
that the most material points wd be secured in favour of British
interests in those waters. But under no circumstances could we
accept the Haro channel as the mid-channel for purposes of
navigation or as a boundary line between the two nations.
The "Middle Channel" wd give us S. Juan, which is one of the
main 
objects to be kept in view in any arrangement.
& that if the arrangement cd be concluded
satisfactorily on that basis you wd not stand out for further
concessions & incur by delay the risk of negotiating hereafter
at a less favourable opportunity. If therefore in his opinion,
and from a closer knowledge of our relations with the U.S. than
is possible for us to have, he thinks that there is a reasonable
prospect of defining the middle channel as the Rosario, you feel
that the most material points wd be secured in favour of British
interests in those waters. But under no circumstances could we
accept the Haro channel as the mid-channel for purposes of
navigation or as a boundary line between the two nations.
The "Middle Channel" wd give us S. Juan, which is one of the
main 
objects to be kept in view in any arrangement.
I have talked this matter over with Mr Merivale and I think that
he agrees in this proposed reply. The only point in wh I think
he may not quite agree with me is whether we gain more by
pressing the question to an arrangement, when the circumstances
of the Colony give us an advantage & so far entitle us to make our
full claims at least—or by allowing the matter to stand over if we
cannot obtain all that we consider ourselves fully entitled to. I
sd be disposed to close a question wh is full of difficulties &
contains the seed of greater embarrassments without delay if we
cd secure the Middle Channel as the boundary line. But this is
a point for your decision.
I annex a draft on a minor point wh this correspondence involves.
C
Mch 23/59
You will inform Lord M. that I consider the possession of St
Juan so indispensable to the safety of B. Columbia, & if
surrendered to the Americans so certain to result in feuds &
even War, that its claim by the British must be fiercely adhered
to. That for the rest I entirely approve of Captn Richard's
views (which are strengthened by private letter from Col. Moody,
this need not be stated).
EBL
Apr 2 1859